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Introduction 
Ask any manager to name a successful 
industrial designer, and the chances are 
that he will come up not with a 
contemporary figure, but with one from 
the 1930s or 1940s: Raymond Loewy, 
perhaps, Henry Dreyfuss, or Ferdinand 
Porsche. Ask about these designers’ work, 
and it is their styling that is remembered. 
Loewy’s Coca Cola bottle and streamlined 
locomotive bodies, Dreyfuss’s Bell 
telephone handsets and Porsche’s 
Volkswagen car are all memorable because 
of their distinctive and enduring shapes. 
Ask an industrial designer the same 
questions, however, and you will get very 
different answers. He will talk first of all 
of contemporaries such as Kenneth Grange 
(Kenwood food mixers), Dieter Rams 
(Braun appliances) or Ettore Sotsass 
(Olivetti computers). And even in the 
context of historical figures he will talk 
of the designer as an integrator, bringing 
together engineering, marketing and 
aesthetic considerations in the detailed 
design of a whole product. He will not 
deny that styling is important, but he will 
argue that it is, and always has been, only 
one part of a good designer’s work. 
This contrast in responses is significant, 
because it underlies what is probably the 
most commonly perceived problem in the 
management of industrial design, the 
problem of how designers should be 
incorporated into the structure of the 
organization. Should a firm have its own 
product design studio, or should it use 
outside consultants? To whom should the 
design manager or consultant report, and 
where should responsibility for the product 
design process lie? In seeking an answer 
to these questions it is obviously important 
to have a clear conception of the role of 
the designers. If, as is often the case, 
there is a conflict between the designers’ 
self -perceptions (the designer as 
integrator) and the way in which they are 
perceived either by related functions or by 
top management (the designer as stylist), 
this must be resolved. 
In seeking such a resolution, moreover, 
another problem arises. Industrial design is 
in fashion. Its value is affirmed daily, both 
by industrial commentators and by 
countless firms anxious to publicize their 
commitment to it. But this commitment is 
closely tied up with the concept of the 
designer as stylist, and it is far from clear 
that the designer as integrator, though 
inherently perhaps more valuable, will find 
anything like the same level of support. 
This is partly, of course, because he poses 
a political threat to others seeking control 
of the product design process. But it may 
also be asked quite reasonably whether the 
designer as integrator is actually necessary 
in the modern technological and managerial 
environment. In the days of bulky 
electrical and mechanical components and 
primitive design engineering facilities it 
may have been necessary for engineers and 
designers to collaborate closely if a 
marketable product was to be created. But 
with the increasingly sophisticated 
facilities of computer aided design 
packages, and an ever-growing range of 
ever-smaller off- the-shelf electronic 
subassemblies, it can be argued that the 
requirements of engineering and style no 
longer conflict as they used to. Again, in 
the days of strongly independent 
functional divisions, the designer may have 
been a necessary mediator between the 
requirements of engineering and sales, or 
more recently marketing. But with modern 
cross-functional organizational structures, 
such as venture groups and project teams, 
it can be argued that this type of 
collaboration is no longer so problematic. 
These arguments do not, in our view, 
invalidate the case for using designers as 
integrators. But they do point to the need 
for a very clear understanding of the 
relationship between the different roles 
the designer can play in the organization, 
and of the relationship between the design 
process and its technical and organization- 
al context. Only by understanding these 
relationships can we hope to resolve the 
conflict of perceptions existing between 
designers and non-designers, and so answer 
the basic question as to how the design 
process should be organized. 
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Stvllsts and lntenrators: the desiener ln 
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Consciously or unconsciously, most people’s 
perceptions of the designer’s role are 
rooted in history, in the images of 
classical product designs. But they rarely 
go beyond these images. In seeking to 
understand the role of the designer in 
today’s corporations it is instructive to 
begin by looking more closely at the 
nature of the achievements of the great 
industrial designers of the past, and 
especially at the relationships between 
these designers and the firms for which 
they worked. 
Although industrial design entered the 
American consciousness in the 193Os, the 
person generally regarded as the founder 
of modern industrial design is Peter 
Behrens, who worked for the German 
electrical firm AEG in the early years of 
this century. Before turning to industrial 
design Behrens was already a well 
established architect, and he continued to 
practise in that capacity. Indeed three of 
the most famous architects of the 
twentieth century, Gropius, Mies van der 
Rohe and le Corbusier, all trained in his 
offices. He was hired by AEG as a 
consultant for the design of consumer 
electrical appliances such as kettles and 
fans, and he was hired, in the first 
instance, as a stylist. But although he 
undertook the aesthetic styling of the 
products, his most notable contribution 
was the introduction of standardized 
components. This innovation, which was 
developed in conjunction with the firm’s 
engineers, allowed AEG to introduce a 
broad product range giving the customer a 
choice of styles and finishes unmatched by 
any of their competitors. 
As an industrial designer Behrens combined 
the role of stylist, which was crucial to 
his commission from AEG, with that of 
integrator, which was crucial to his 
success in that commission and to the 
profits derived from it by the firm. And 
we can say much the same about the first 
of the great American designers, Raymond 
Loewy. Loewy was an artist. Before he 
established himself as an industrial 
designer he worked as a graphic illustrator 
and display designer, and his industrial 
design reputation was built upon his 
achievements as a visual stylist. His 
designs for streamlined locomotive bodies 
gave visual expression to the excitement 
of the golden age of the express railway 
steam engine, but bore little relation 
otherwise to the engineering underneath 
the bodies. His Greyhound coach design 
transferred this excitement to the 
highway, but was again only an outer skin 
for an existing basic product. His “Coke” 
bottle, which again captured something of 
the same excitement, was a purely visual 
triumph. But his consultancy was not 
restricted to such work. He also designed 
duplicating machines for Gestetner and 
refrigerators for Sears Roebuck, and in 
both these cases he became deeply 
involved with the engineering efficiency of 
the products as well as with their 
appearance, directing the work of the 
firms’ engineers and integrating their 
developments with an aesthetic appeal to 
the customer. 
This combination of the stylist and 
integrator is even more apparent in the 
work of Loewy’s contemporary Henry 
Dreyfuss. Dreyfuss established his 
reputation as a stage designer, and when 
Bell Telephones sought his services in the 
1930s they sought the services of a visual 
stylist. Dreyfuss accepted the commission, 
however, only on the condition that he be 
allowed to work directly with the Bell 
engineers on the total design of their 
products. To Bell, the idea of having a 
scientifically unqualified designer 
interfering in the work of their hallowed 
research laboratories must have been 
almost frightening, and they agreed to the 
condition only reluctantly. But it was a 
condition that provided the basis for three 
decades of immensely successful collabora- 
tion. Dreyfuss also became one of the 
founders of design ergonomics, and many 
of his most successful commissions, such 
as those for Lockheed on aircraft seating, 
for Hyster on fork lift trucks and for 
John Deere on tractors, were concerned 
with ergonomic engineering as much as 
with styling. 
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The most famous designer of the 
generation following Loewy and Dreyfuss 
(and of the last generation upon which we 
can look back historically) is probably 
Dieter Rams, and in his work too we find 
the same juxtaposition of roles. Rams’s 
most notable achievement was the design 
of the highly distinctive range of small 
electrical appliances introduced by the 
Braun company in the 1960s and 1970s. 
These appliances undoubtedly had style, 
but their tremendous success and the 
consequent growth of the company 
depended on far more than that. The neat, 
compact designs depended crucially on 
engineering developments, and it was the 
integration of engineering and style which 
gave them their strong market appeal, and 
which was above all characteristic of the 
distinctive Braun style. , 
The examples of Behrens, Loewy, Dreyfuss 
and Rams illustrate vividly the contribu- 
tions that can be made by the designer as 
integrator. But it is striking that in all 
four cases the role of integrator arose out 
of a prior relationship in which the 
designer was retained primarily as a 
stylist. And in the end, as in the 
beginning, it was the designer’s abilities as 
a stylist that were most valued by his 
clients, and that provided the basis of his 
reputation. The integrating roles which the 
designers took upon themselves may have 
been crucial to the design process, but 
they were regarded by the clients either 
as means to an end, the end being style, 
or as peculiar to the individual designers 
concerned. Just as some engineers, such as 
the car designers Ferdinand Porsche or 
Alec Issigonis, were blessed with a flair 
for style, so these designers were blessed 
with a flair for engineering. But that flair 
was perceived as a bonus, not as a normal 
part of the designer’s role. 
When we look beyond the great designers 
to the history of industrial design as a 
whole, we do indeed find that the number 
of designers who have filled an active 
integrating role is small. Whatever their 
ideals or ambitions, most have been 
employed as stylists, and have moved 
relatively little beyond that role. And 
there are moreover some indications that 
this situation has been accentuate 
development of technology. Whi 
Rams was working in Europe, the most 
prominent American industrial designer of 
the 1960s and early 1970s was Eliot Noyes, 
an architect and interior designer 
commissioned by IBM to design its new 
ranges of computers and other business 
machines. Noyes’s job was, in effect, to 
create an IBM product image that captured 
both the traditional corporate strengths of 
user appeal, reliability and service, and the 
technological excitement of the new 
computer age. Conceptually, his success 
depended strongly on an integrative 
approach. But given the sophistication, 
complexity and sheer difficulty of the 
technology, there was no way he could 
have more than a small influence on the 
engineering design of the products. In 
practical terms, he was a stylist. 
If there are lessons to be drawn from the 
history of industrial design they are, first, 
that the role of the designer as integrator 
has been a very rare one, and one that 
has depended both on the peculiar talents 
of individuals and on an appropriate 
technological context; but secondly, that 
some of the very best design work has 
depended on the designer taking an 
integrative role. Even if you cannot call 
on a Loewy or Dreyfuss, there may still be 
a very strong case for attempting to 
replicate artificially the processes by 
which they worked. 
ackq Bl 
%n lntefzrator? 
Taken at its face value, this last point 
seems to suggest the need for some kind 
of integrating force within the product 
development process. In functional terms, 
the need is to synthesize the requirements 
of marketing, engineering, production and 
design, in the sense of styling, within a 
total product design process. Historically 
this synthesis has been achieved by 
outstanding individuals, whether designers 
or engineers. In the context of the large 
modern corporation, a coordinating group 
or department might provide an alternative 
and more appropriate model. But it may 
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also be questioned, within this context, 
whether such a coordinating mechanism is 
needed at all. In electronics-based products 
especially, the availability of a wide range 
of sophisticated components, and the 
progressive miniaturization of components, 
have placed the design engineer in a 
position in which he can adapt his design 
to almost any spatial restrictions the 
stylist might impose. The availability of 
sophisticated computer aided design 
packages has also improved dramatically 
the flexibility of engineering design. 
Whereas in the past the matching of 
engineering capabilities to marketing 
specifications may have been a matter of 
trial and error requiring very careful 
coordination if it was to be achieved 
within reasonable time and cost, the 
requirements may now be simply fed into a 
computer. 
Management practices have also changed. 
Whereas in the past the engineering and 
marketing functions tended to occupy quite 
separate worlds, in the modern corporation 
they are more closely linked. In the large 
corporation, in particular, it is likely that 
any significant new product development 
will entail the setting up of a cross- 
functional project or venture group, in 
which representatives from the different 
functions will work directly with each 
other, and in which a separate coordinator 
would appear to be superfluous. 
Appearances can be deceptive, however. 
All the evidence suggests that in the great 
majority of American and European firms 
the relationships between the technology- 
based functions and the marketing function 
remain problematical.’ The conflict 
between the two groups may be countered 
by the cohesive effects of a strong 
corporate culture and small highly- 
motivated project groups, but it is rarely 
eliminated. If a project group is small 
enough to overcome the problems of 
interfunctional conflict in itself, it is 
unlikely to be large enough to carry out 
the product development without heavy 
reliance on the rest of the organization. 
While it may itself operate as a coordinat- 
ing body, it will not escape the effects of 
the conflict. 
Such conflict is clearly a hindrance to the 
total product design process, and it also 
affects directly the role of the designer. If 
we look at the firm as a political 
structure composed of negotiating interest 
groups, we find that the groups with the 
greatest power are those which control the 
boundary between the firm and its 
environment. In particular, the marketing 
function, which takes its authority from a 
knowledge of the firm’s customers, tends 
to be one of the most powerful.’ In most 
firms, the marketing department is also 
responsible for industrial design, whether 
this is carried out inside or outside the 
firm. The designers’ primary role, as 
stylists, is to provide visual shape to the 
product concepts emanating from 
marketing, and the other activities of a 
design studio, such as the design of 
packaging or publications, are also closely 
linked to the marketing process. In the 
absence of any conflict between marketing 
and engineering this would make sound 
sense. As it is, however, the designers are 
often caught in a trap. On one hand they 
are a part of the marketing function. On 
the other hand, because of their wish to 
collaborate with the engineers, they are 
also a political threat to that function. 
Not only is active collaboration between 
the functions minimized, but far from 
acting as integrators the designers 
themselves are more isolated than anyone. 
They have no political power base of their 
own, no share in that of their host 
department, and, because of the power of 
that department, no way of appealing to a 
wider constituency. 
Meanwhile the engineers, though they 
might also resent the marketing function’s 
dominance, are unlikely to bemoan the 
lack of collaboration. For with the 
advances in components and engineering 
design aids we have mentioned it is 
actually possible to design a product with 
a minimum of collaboration, and in a 
politicized context this corresponds to a 
minimum of hassle. The question is, 
though, whether it is possible to achieve a 
good design in this way, and whether you 
can achieve it efficiently. Can you tell 
the difference between a product which is 
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conceived as a whole, through the active 
collaboration between engineers and 
designers, and one which is designed 
piecemeal, with an engineering design 
being adapted to a stylistic concept or 
vice versa? Can you distinguish between 
the efficiencies of the two processes? 
The answer to this question must lie in 
the practices of those firms whose 
commercial success is built upon their 
design strengths, or who are able to 
charge a premium for their product 
designs. And what we find in such firms is 
that there are integrating mechanisms, and 
that these mechanisms are often linked 
closely to the role of the designer. If we 
look Sony, for example, which is one of 
the most successful of all firms at turning 
design into profit, we find not only a 
belief in active collaboration but also a 
system for implementing such collaboration 
which effectively reproduces artificially 
the traditional role of the designer as 
integrator. Since 1985, Sony’s organization 
for new product development has been 
based on a Consumer Systems Products and 
Design division which is in effect an 
autonomous industrial design department, 
but one augmented by marketing and 
development engineering skills. It is 
independent of the marketing, new product 
development, and product divisions, 
centralized at headquarters, and with a 
strong corporate visibility. And it acts not 
only as the corporation’s design resource 
but as a source of new product ideas in 
its own right and a nurturer of ideas 
which arise in other divisions but which 
for one reason or another are not 
developed there. If black box and 
computer aided design technology or 
modern management practices did in fact 
eliminate the need for design process 
coordinators, then Sony is precisely the 
sort of firm in which one would expect to 
find this demonstrated. Instead we find 
one of the strongest statements of this 
need in any organization. 
Oreanizations for desinn effectiveness 
There are three key features of the Sony 
organization. The design department is 
autonomous: it has its own board level 
representation, and does not report 
through another department such as 
marketing. It is central to the product 
design process, explicitly responsible for 
integrating and coordinating that process. 
And it is invested with authority: it is an 
important power base in its own right. 
In other organizations where the design 
process is a demonstrable source of added 
value, other organizational structures are 
used, but these three features remain 
constant. 
In Olivetti, widely recognized as one of 
the world’s most successful firms in design 
terms, the designers occupy a position half 
in and half out of the organization. In 
organizational terms the design studio 
(actually two studios, in part competition 
with each other) operates as an autonom- 
ous functional division within the firm. But 
the designers are employed as consultants. 
Their offices and studios are part of the 
Olivetti corporation and they are fully 
resourced from within that corporation, 
but they are free and indeed expected to 
work for other clients from their Olivetti 
base. The justification for this practice is 
that it has enabled Olivetti to recruit and 
retain a series of outstanding designers, 
including Marcello Nizzoli, Mario Bellini 
and Ettore Sotsass, without sacrificing the 
advantages of an in-house department. In 
organizational terms the design department 
is not central to the product design 
process in the way that Sony’s is. It does 
not have its own marketing or engineering 
resources, and it is actually physically 
removed from the centre of the organiza- 
tion. What it does have is a tremendous 
authority, derived from the status and 
reputation of its designers (and enhanced 
by the tremendous respect for design 
characteristic of the Italian culture 
generally) which ensures that it cannot be 
treated as other than central to the 
overall product design process. 
Another example is the Dutch company, 
Philips, which employs an organization 
similar to that of Sony. The Philips 
Industrial Design Centre is, like its Sony 
counterpart, a headquarters organization 
enjoying top management support and 
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independent of marketing and engineering 
development. It does not incorporate its 
own marketing and engineering teams as at 
Sony, and it is not central to the design 
process in the sense of being responsible 
automatically for the coordination of the 
process. Philips like to visualise their 
design, engineering and marketing 
activities as the three equal vertices of a 
development process triangle, and in 
practice the designers often play a 
subsidiary role, coming into a project at a 
relatively late stage to negotiate and 
compromise between the very powerful 
engineering and marketing constituencies. 
But for any project viewed by top 
management as a priority , this position 
can be reversed, and when targets can 
only be met by a close collaboration 
between marketing and engineering, it is, 
as at Sony, the design department that 
takes on the integrative iole and makes 
such collaboration possible. 
The Philips example also demonstrates 
another important facet of the design 
process. For while this process is central 
to the firm’s success it is not reflected in 
any price premium. For Philips the 
problem faced when they set up their 
design organization was not so much to 
design better products. than anyone else, 
but to match the combination of the 
general design standards and new product 
lead times of their emerging Japanese 
competitors. And it was the lead time 
problem that was crucial. In Philips as in 
many other companies, the designers used 
to be brought in only at the end of the 
engineering development process to style 
the finished product. ‘In a strong 
technology-led culture, the technology 
itself was often developed over very long 
periods to unnecessarily high specifica- 
tions, and ill-suited to the market-based 
needs of the designers. There consequently 
followed a long process of adapting the 
engineering design to marketing and 
stylistic requirements. The introduction of 
a strong marketing function helped force 
the pace of the initial engineering 
development process, and make it more 
relevant to general market needs by 
providing broad performance specifications. 
But the detailed product design process, 
which still followed the main engineering 
development, remained long and drawn out, 
even with modern engineering design aids. 
It was only when the designers were given 
a central coordinating role, and began 
working with the engineers from the 
beginning of a project, that product 
development cycles were reduced to within 
sight of those of the firm’s Japanese 
competitors. 
The lead time improvements achieved by 
Philips were dramatic, of the order of 50% 
or more, and the lesson to be learnt from 
their experience is an important one. Even 
if we view designers as stylists, that does 
not mean that their work is independent 
of the engineers’ or that the two 
contributions can be organized sequential- 
ly. For if the styling requires just one 
change in the engineering design that will 
almost inevitably lead to other changes, 
which may not themselves fit in with the 
stylistic requirements. So there will then 
have to be more changes and so on. If the 
designers and stylists do not work hand in 
hand from the beginning the problem of 
reconciling their differences, however 
small, is apt to be large and very time 
consuming. 
If, on the other hand, the designer is 
brought in at the beginning of a project, 
he almost inevitably becomes an integrator. 
Engineers can work on their own. So can 
marketers. But a designer simply cannot 
work without both a product to design and 
a marketing concept or image to design to. 
Unlike any of the other participants in the 
total product design process the nature of 
his role as stylist forces him to col- 
laborate closely with the other functions. 
In a purely technical sense, he has to 
integrate their work into his own. 
This does not mean, of course, that every 
designer will be an integrator, in the 
sense that he will have the ability to 
direct or dominate the total product design 
process. On the contrary, as we have 
already noted, it may be only a few 
designers who have this sort of ability. 
But it does mean that the design 
department is a natural focus of coordina- 
tion and collaboration. And it suggests 
strongly that if coordination and 
collaboration are to be effective, the 
design department should itself be 
effective. 
How this can be achieved in practice 
depends on the context. In some 
organizations the marketing function itself 
in able to fulfil1 an integrating role. In 
many Japanese corporations, for example, 
marketing executives are trained engineers 
who know as much about their firms’ 
internal research and development 
expertise as they do about their external 
markets. Collaboration between marketing 
and engineering is less of a problem than 
in most Western firms, and the designers 
may operate quite effectively either within 
the marketing division or responsible to it. 
Conversely, in some strongly technology- 
led firms, such as component manufac- 
turers or specialist industrial engineers, it 
may be appropriate to incorporate design 
as a part of engineering development. For 
most firms, however, the best results are 
likely to come from a high profile, 
authoritative and autonomous design 
department, with its own board level 
representation. Experience shows that if 
the design department is not autonomous, 
if it is responsible as in most firms to 
marketing, or if it does not have a 
champion on the board, it is almost 
inevitably marginalized by more powerful 
interest groups and cannot perform 
effective1y.s 
To be effective, designers must also be 
good at their work and command the 
respect not only of their peers but of 
others in the organization, and it is here 
that the choice between internal 
departments and external consultants 
becomes a factor. In principle, either 
arrangement can be successful, as can a 
variety of combinations between the two. 
Three of the four most often quoted 
models for design management, Sony, 
Philips and Ford, all use internal design 
departments. The fourth, Olivetti, uses a 
hybrid model. And many of the most 
highly regarded individual designs are the 
work of consultants, such as Kenneth 
Grange of Pentagram whose credits include 
Wilkinson Sword razors, Kenwood food 
mixers, Maruzen sewing machines and 
Kodak Instamatic cameras. Many large 
corporations have their own internal 
departments but bring in external 
consultants for specific projects. But not 
all arrangements will work for all firms. 
For a small firm, the problem of recruiting 
a strong internal department will often be 
insuperable. The design culture is a 
strongly individualistic one, and most 
designers feel more comfortable as 
consultants than as employees. They can 
also get a far greater variety of work in a 
consultancy than in a small firm. On the 
firm’s side, the skills with which to choose 
a designer are unlikely to be at hand, and 
the risks to a small firm of making a bad 
choice are considerable. It is generally 
much better to go to an established design 
consultancy whose design skills and mode 
of operation you know and like. An 
outside consultancy is also likely to carry 
much greater authority within the 
organization than a fledgling internal 
department. Its strengths are proven and 
demonstrable, and the very role of 
consultant carries with it a status of 
authority. It also carries a freedom to 
move across internal boundaries, and in 
establishing a fruitful collaboration within 
the product design process this freedom 
can be crucial. 
As a firm grows, so do the advantages of 
bringing design in-house. Once the role of 
the designer is accepted and understood 
throughout the organization, and a process 
of coordination established, there may well 
be gains to be derived from having a team 
of designers wholly committed to the 
organization, immersed in its corporate 
culture, and in constant interaction with 
its other members. Recruitment may be no 
easier, however. The firm will probably 
have a much clearer idea of what it wants. 
It will have an established commitment to 
design, and may well be able to offer a 
broader range of work, both of which will 
appeal to prospective employees. But the 
prospect of employment in a large 
corporation is likely to even more 
repellant to designers than that of working 
in a small one. Moreover the consultant 
will still have the advantage in terms of 
8 
authority. In a country like Italy, where 
designers enjoy a high social status, 
authority is not so much of a problem, 
but the very fact that they do enjoy a 
high status allows them to retain their 
independence from industry by working 
through consultancy relationships. In 
America, where designers have a relatively 
low status, they may be more ready to 
work in industry, but the firm’s need for 
an authoritative design group will place a 
greater premium on the use of consultants. 
In this context a firm’s strategy should 
perhaps be opportunist. If the opportunity 
arises to recruit an established team of 
respected designers who have already 
acquired authority through their 
consultancy for the firm, this should 
probably be taken. Whether employed full 
time or in some Olivetti-like relationship, 
such a team stands a good chance of 
establishing its position in the firm, and 
can form the nucleus of a department 
which can then be built up as required by 
recruitment in the normal way. But if such 
an opportunity does not arise, it is 
probably wiser to stick to consultants. 
Finally, the use of consultants need not 
preclude the setting up of an internal 
department, or vice versa. If the design 
operation grows large enough it may be 
possible to build a team of junior 
designers employed by the firm but 
responsible to the consultants, and from 
this a design department may in time 
evolve. And even with a fully-fledged 
internal design department there is still a 
role for external consultants. A design 
team that is closely in tune with the 
corporate image can also be restricted by 
that image. In design, as in all creative 
activities, the freshness and critical 
insight that can be contributed by an 
outsider is always of value. 
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